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JUDICIAL DEFLECTION OF SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS:
PUSHING LAETRILE TOWARDS MEDICAL CLOSURE
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever merits or demerits the judicial process may otherwise possess, that process is generally presumed to be superior to scientific debate
as a method of obtaining resolutions of conflict, or closure.' The judicial
process provides a precise, definite, and final conclusion to any controversy within a defined time and according to a generally understood and
formally delineated procedure. For this reason, plaintiffs usually seek
resolution of disputes through litigation rather than through academic
debates, constitutional conventions, or other less well defined processes.
Itis fanciful to believe, however, that a lawsuit will inevitably lead to
closure on scientific issues that litigants place before the court. Such a
belief supposes a very narrow view of judicial conduct and decisionmaking in the area of scientific dispute: that the court is able and willing
to weigh scientific arguments and declare a winner.
As others have suggested, 2 judicial consideration and decision would
provide an inadequate way to resolve scientific disputes even if the judiciary were willing to undertake such efforts. Fortunately, the courts
have generally recognized their inadequacy to impose solutions to scientific questions. The American judiciary has instead perceived its role
to be one of maintaining the integrity of the technical decision making
process, and thus requiring those institutions which are better able to
resolve matters of science to do the careful scientific work that the resolution of these matters requires.
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author is indebted to Nancy
Kirkwood, now a member of the New Mexico bar, for her research into the history of the chemical
and biomedical literature concerning laetrile and amygdalin therapy for cancer, for her enlightening
analysis of that history, and for her careful comparison of the medical and political development of
the laetrile debate. This article was prepared for the Research Group on Closure of Scientific Disputes,
The Hastings Center, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.
1. The term "closure" may be used to refer to several different kinds of resolution of social policy
and scientific questions. T. Beauchamp, Ethical Theory and the Problem of Closure (to be published
in a volume tentatively titled Scientific Controversies: Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure
of Disputes Concerning Science and Technology (Caplan & Engelhardt eds.)) describes four senses
of closure. The four are "sound argument closure," "procedural closure," negotiation closure," and
"natural death closure." Unless otherwise specified, the term "closure" is used here to describe the
practical termination of debate about a particular issue of public policy.
2. See, e.g., M. Wessel, Science and Conscience (1980); R. Young, The Federal Regulation of
Laetrile (to be published in Caplan & Engelhardt, supra note 1).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

This judicial strategy was successfully employed in the recent debate
over the efficacy of laetrile as a treatment for cancer. The courts were
accused of trying to step beyond the natural limitations of their competence in their participation in the laetrile debate. This accusation is illfounded, insofar as it suggests that the courts have purported to resolve
the scientific dispute. In all the opinions rendered in all the lawsuits
involving challenges to government regulation of laetrile, no court has
ever reached a scientific conclusion; no court has ever engaged in scientific
research, and no court has ever attempted a formal and scientific evaluation of the medical value of laetrile. The courts have always recognized
the laetrile controversy as a scientific dispute, and have never attempted
to impose closure upon it.
When Rutherford v. United States,3 the most significant of the laetrile
cases, first came into court, the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Medical Association and
other well-regarded scientific institutions with an interest in the issue
considered the medical questions to be well settled. The consequence of
judicial consideration of this matter was not to close the scientific controversy; rather, the courts opened that controversy and required the medical community and the FDA to do the scientific work necessary for a
proper resolution of the issue. When laetrile litigation began, there was
virtually no respectable scientific work on the toxicity or effectiveness of
laetrile. Now, in part as a consequence of the Rutherford case and other
litigation, the NCI has completed a retrospective study of claimed laetrile
cures, 4 a pharmacologic and toxicological study of amygdalin.5 Additionally, the NCI now has conducted a phase 1I study of laetile and
determined, formally and finally, the absence of any anti-tumor activity
or favorable symptomatic effects or effects on survival as a consequence
of laetrile use. 6 Remarkably, the extraordinarily vigorous political debate
that surrounded laetrile has not been reborn following this respectable
scientific showing of the lack of laetrile efficacy. Even the advocates of
3. 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), class certified,
429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), on remand, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937
(1980).
4. See Ellison, Byar & Newell, Special Report on Laetrile: The NCI Laetrile Review, 299 New
Eng. i. Med. 549 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ellison].
5. Moertel, Ames, Kovach, Moyer, Rubin & Tinker, A Pharmacologic and Toxicological Study
of Amygdalin, 245 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 591 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Moertell.
6. In the spring of 1981, Dr. Moertel reported to the American Society of Clinical Oncologists
that the multi-center NCI investigation of laetrile showed it to be ineffective in improving the life
span or symptoms of the patients studied. The studies were conducted in such a way that the subjects
received the same laetrile dose and diet supported by laetrile advocates. See Easy "Cures'for Cancer
Still Find Support, 246 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 714 (1981).
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laetrile do not seem interested in challenging the long-awaited, longdesired, and ethically controversial NCI study report.7
No one doubts that this scientific endeavor, spurred by the court, was
part of what led to closure on the laetrile issue. The medical and scientific
sophistication of the NCI-funded researchers' is well respected by traditional opponents of laetrile. Their apparent neutrality, which is demonstrated by their recent conclusion that laetrile is not toxic in doses
recommended by its proponents, 9 provided the NCI study with credibility
among the supporters of laetrile. The purpose of this article is to evaluate
the role of the judiciary in bringing about what has become a laboratory
resolution of this issue.
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN RESOLVING
SCIENTIFIC DISPUTES
Courts are not well equipped to make traditional scientific inquiries.
They do not contain laboratories and judges are rarely trained scientists.
Although procedures are available which permit the court to employ
scientific experts, 10 these devices are cumbersome and are not often employed. Judges recognize this inadequacy, but they are also often confronted with litigation that requires the resolution of questions of science
and technology. The nature of the judiciary's response to these cases
depends on the nature of the scientific or technical question presented.
There are three broad classes of litigation which involve scientific
questions. First, scientific questions might arise merely because of the
litigation itself. In those cases, the courts resolve the questions. Second,
scientific issues that are feigned or inconsequential to the underlying
policy issues which are the real subject of the lawsuit might arise. In
such a case, the courts identify the scientific issues as secondary ones
and resolve the policy question. Finally, the courts have recently faced
litigation which depends on the resolution of both policy issues and
7. The ethical propriety of the laetrile debate was a hotly debated issue in the medical community.
See Lipsett & Fletcher, Ethics of Laetrile Clinical Trials, 297 New Eng. J. Med. t183-84 (1977).
While the initial reaction to the negative finding of the NCI study was political and predictable, see
Laetrile Study Called "Set Up," N.Y. Times, May 1, 1981, at A26, that reaction has not been
sustained-it has simply faded away.
8. The NCI tests were conducted at the Mayo Clinic, Memorial-Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center,
U.C.L.A., and the University of Arizona.
9. Moertel, supra note 5.
10. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 and N.M. R. Civ. P. 53 provide for the appointment of masters,
who may be technical experts. Courts may appoint masters to prepare scientific reports which the
court will accept as evidence. The neutrality of the master generally makes such evidence highly
persuasive.
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debated scientific questions. In such cases, exemplified by the laetrile
controversy, the courts have been anxious to deflect the issues back into
the laboratories of the protagonists, and to act to facilitate a scientific
closure rather than a legal one.
A. The First Class-Technical Questions Which Have Meaning Only
Within the Context of Litigation
Courts are frequently called upon to resolve questions involving scientific evidence which arise solely because of the prosecution of the
lawsuit. For example, questions of the negligence of a physician (or other
technical or scientific professional), the cause of death of a homicide
victim, and the speed of a car careening through an intersection into an
accident all have scientific components. In such cases, however, the
technical question arises only because it is necessary to determine criminal
culpability or civil liability. These scientific questions are entirely legal
constructs, and they arise only because the court must resolve them to
assess individual obligations. When the legal proceedings are terminated,
the scientific questions become moot and meaningless-just as they would
have been ab initio if the lawsuit had never been commenced. Because
these questions are so integrally related to the resolution of legal policy,
it is perfectly appropriate that they be resolved in court. Although some
physicians have found this arrangement to be unsatisfactory as it is applied
to professional negligence, there has been little attempt to limit the court's
role in resolving these essentially legal questions. I
B. The Second Class-Policy Questions Involving Fully Resolved
Scientific Issues
Some lawsuits that appear to require the resolution of scientific disputes
in fact involve policy questions that deal with established technical or
scientific principles. The debate over the propriety of teaching evolution
in public schools is an example of such an issue. The scientific basis of
that "theory" is fully established. Among the scientific community, it has
been clearly, definitely and certainly resolved. Even those who oppose
the teaching of evolution in the public school, or wish to have alternative
11. Several recent legislative reforms of the malpractice process have provided for expert panel
review of medical malpractice claims before those claims are filed in court. These statutes generally
do not require that the panel make a finding of negligence before the action can be commenced in
court. The statutes represent the medical profession's response to what they perceived to be general
inadequacies in the legal resolution of disputes involving professional negligence. They are directed
only toward the courts' lack of qualifications to understand medical testimony. See Comment, An
Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417;
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 Md. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
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theories presented, admit, with rare exceptions, that evolution is the only
explanation justifiable on purely scientific terms.2
The scientific aspect of the question can be ignored, and the decision
made on grounds of law and policy. In 1968 the United States Supreme
Court considered a constitutional attack on an Arkansas statute barring
the public school instruction in evolution, 3 and resolved the legal issue
entirely on first amendment free speech and establishment of religion
grounds. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, concluded:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of
knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason
that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that
is, with a particular interpretation of the book of Genesis by a particular religious group."
For the Court, the question simply was not one of science; it was one of
the policy of the first amendment. When a feigned scientific dispute is
properly cast in terms of a constitutional application of uncontested scientific knowledge, the role of the judiciary is clear: the court has both
the expertise and obligation to make such determinations.
C. The Third and Most Difficult Class-Mixed Questions Involving
Unresolved Policy Issues and Unresolved Scientific Questions
The most difficult questions for the courts have been those questions
which include the application of disputed policy to truly disputed scientific
issues. The effective denial of access to laetrile, the regulation of nonmedical practice of acupuncture, and the administrative determination of
the amount of benzene that can appropriately appear in a "safe" workspace are examples of these difficult disputes. One way out of the difficulty
is for the court to avoid the scientific questions entirely. The courts could
resolve these controversies entirely on social policy grounds, in ways
which would render the scientific resolution of the problem legally meaningless. For example, the right of privacy could be extended to protect
12. Even many of those, caught up in the current religious revival in this country, who oppose
the teaching of evolution in the public schools realize that alternative creationist theories have no
more basis in traditional science than does the theory of evolution. See Lindsey, Creationists Gather
to Try Toppling Darwin'sPedestal, N.Y. Times (Week in Review), March 1, 1981, at E20. In fact,
in a recent version of the famous Scopes "monkey" trial, a California Superior Court judge refused
to allow into testimony any evidence of the scientific validity of evolution or biblical creation. See
Coast Trial on Study of Evolution Focuses on Language of Guidelines, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1981,
at AI0. Although there has been an attempt to validate the creationist beliefs by labeling them
"creation science," the courts have not been so naive as to accept this characterization. See McLean
v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267-72 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
14. Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
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a patient's access to laetrile or acupuncture treatment even if those treatments were found to be ineffective or affirmatively harmful. 5 Similarly,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197016 could be construed to
prohibit the exposure of any employee to any carcinogen, including benzene, at any level. These resolutions are unsatisfactory in the long run,
however. Politically and socially acceptable policy might result from the
adoption of such principles, and important scientific inquiry in these areas
might be discouraged.
Another solution to the problem of mixed science and policy questions
might be the mirror image of avoidance on legal grounds; just as a legal
resolution of these questions would render the scientific evaluation moot,
scientific closure would render the legal policy determination needless.
If laetrile or acupuncture could be proved to be both effective and nontoxic, there would be little objection to their application. Similarly, if
careful and well-accepted scientific studies indicate that either one is
harmful and ineffective, there will be no demand for their legal availability. It is a well-established principle of American law that a court will
not decide a constitutional question unless it is necessary for it to do so. I7
Scientific closure would thus allow the judiciary to avoid constitutional
issues.
When a lawsuit can be resolved on statutory, regulatory or procedural
grounds, the court will refrain from resolving the constitutional issue.
Courts appear to be accepting the potential scientific resolution of policy
disputes as yet another alternative to making constitutional determinations. Where a policy closure can follow from a laboratory conclusion,
the courts will attempt to deflect the issue out of the judicial arena and
back into the laboratory.
One example of such deflection is the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute. 8 In that case the United States Supreme Court was faced
with an OSHA administrative determination that the "safe" level of benzene in the atmosphere of the workplace was to be lowered from 10 parts
per million to 1 part per million.' 9 Rather than determine precisely the
15. The two leading privacy cases are those which established the qualified constitutional right
of a woman to choose to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), have figured prominently in the arguments made in virtually all recent cases
involving access to laetrile or acupuncture. See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977), vacated, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 949 (1979) (laetrile); Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (acupuncture); and, of course, the Rutherford opinions, cited supra note 3.
16. 29 U.S.C. §651-678 (1976).
17. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Rutledge, J.). See also Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979), 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), as amended 43 Fed. Reg.
27962 (1978), cited in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 625.
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scientific propriety of one standard or another, the Court reviewed the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the administrative decision to determine whether that decision constituted arbitrary action. Finding that there
was no scientific evidence to suggest that one standard was more appropriate than the other, four of the five justices in the majority voted to
strike down the new administrative standard. 21 In doing so, the United
States Supreme Court carefully avoided the policy issues, including the
application of cost-benefit analysis to occupational health determinations,
which were the subject of the arguments made to the Court by both sides.
The Court's decision has the effect of remanding back into the laboratories
the question of whether one standard is scientifically superior to another.
The opinion makes clear that the new benzene regulation would be legally
sound if it were supported by competent scientific evidence. 2' Of course,
if it were thus supported, the policy issue would be resolved outside of
the Court. By deciding the Industrial Union case as it did, the Court
required that the final resolution of the benzene dispute come from the
scientific community, not the judiciary.
The laetrile controversy provides another example of judicial deflection
of a mixed policy and science question out of the judiciary back into the
laboratories. Before 1975, when the first significant laetrile litigationRutherford v. United States22-found its way into the federal court system,
there was no scientifically respectable medical study of either the toxicity
or the effectiveness of laetrile. Now, seven years and seven Rutherford
opinions later, the judiciary, leaving no nationally binding constitutional
precedent behind it, has removed itself as a factor in the resolution of
the laetrile controversy, while the NCI has pursued serious inquiry into
the medical merits of the drug.
III. THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL STATUS OF LAETRILE IN
1975
When Glen Rutherford intervened as a plaintiff in Stowe v. United
States23 in 1975, he became party to a case which would be the most
important judicial consideration into the laetrile controversy. Rutherford
was a sympathetic plaintiff supported by an able attorney. The case was
scheduled before a thoughtful and well-respected district court judge who
became the first federal judge to analyze seriously the legal issues raised
by those seeking access to laetrile. Although other cases have raised
20. The fifth justice in the 5-4 majority was Justice Rehnquist, who found the statutory scheme

was a constitutionally impermissible delegation of Congressional authority to an administrative
agency. 448 U.S. at 671.
21. 448 U.S. at 642.
22. Supra note 3.
23. No. CIV 75-0218-B (W.D. Okla). The first reported opinion in this case is Rutherford v.
United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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similar issues, 24 they rarely have been accorded more than perfunctory

hearings at the trial level, and few of the cancer-ridden plaintiffs have
remained alive long enough to docket appeals. Mr. Rutherford's longevity
and his use of the class action device made the Rutherford case the primary
legal focus of those concerned with the laetrile dispute, and it remains
the only piece of litigation involving laetrile to be heard by the United
States Supreme Court.
In order to understand the nature of Mr. Rutherford's legal claim it is
important to evaluate the administrative regulation which led to the effective banning of laetrile. In addition, because the operation of the legal
regulation itself depends on the status of the scientific research, it is
important to summarize the scientific data available on the toxicity and
effectiveness of laetrile in 1975.
A. Legal Regulation of Laetrile
The FDA treats laetrile as a "new drug" subject to regulation under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 5 A "new drug" is "any drug . . .
not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended or
"26 A "drug,"
under the Act, includes
suggested in the labeling .
anything offered for the treatment, cure, mitigation, diagnosis, or prevention of disease.2 7 It is illegal to import or move in interstate commerce
any new drug not formally approved by the FDA.28 The United States
may seek an injunction against those who violate the statute, and may
also seek to prosecute offenders criminally. 29 In addition, any drug shipped
in interstate commerce or imported in violation of the statute is subject
to seizure."
For a new drug to be approved under the Act, its sponsor must file an
application which includes "full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such
24. See, e.g., United States v. Mosinee Research Corp., 583 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Spectro Foods, 544 F.2d 1175 (3rd Cir. 1976); United States v. Articles of Food & Drug,
444 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Gadler v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 244 (D. Minn. 1977)
(all upholding the FDA's effective ban on laetrile). See also Rizzo v. United States, 432 F. Supp.
356 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) and Millet, Pit & Seed Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Tenn.
1977) (both blocking FDA attempts to limit access to amygdalin).
25. 21 U.S.C. §3 2 1(p)(1) (1976).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B).
28. Id. § 355(a).
29. Id. § 332, 333.
30. Id. § 334.
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The FDA will not approve the application

if the investigations do not include adequate tests "by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under
the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested

. .

. ;" if the tests

do not show the drug is safe, if "there is a lack of substantial evidence
that the drug will have the effect it reports or is represented to have under
the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested . . . ;" or

if the labeling is false or misleading in any particular. 2 Essentially, a
drug's sponsor must prove that it is both safe and effective for the purposes
for which it is sold before the FDA can approve it. The burden of proof
is put on the sponsor, who must prove his case by "substantial evidence."
Substantial evidence is defined by the statute as
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations,
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have under the conditions of use. . .. "
Obviously a drug must be available for use in clinical trials before it
can be approved as a new drug. Thus, the statute provides for an Investigational New Drug license (IND) to be issued to those "experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety and effectiveness of drugs." The FDA will issue an IND, however, only upon a
showing that the drug displays promise on the basis of studies conducted
without human subjects.34 In the absence of an approved new drug ap-

plication or an approved IND, a drug may be imported or moved in
interstate commerce only if it is exempted from the Act.
The 1962 grandfather clause in the Act provides the only exemption
relevant to the case of laetrile. The Drug Amendments of 1962, which
added the effectiveness requirements to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, also added the grandfather clause.3 5 The 1962 Amendments
were a consequence of the desire to tighten government control of un31. Id. § 355 (b)(l). The statute also imposes several other less onerous burdens. See id. § 355(b)
(2)-(6).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976). The other requirements must also be satisfied.
33. Id. See also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973). The
new drug approval process also requires administrative evaluation of the ingredients of manufacture,
the methods and facilities used in manufacture, the complete labeling, and samples of the drug. 21
U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1) (1976). There are additional requirements. See id. § 355(i)(2) - (3).
35. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107, 52 Stat. 1052.
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proven drugs which followed the thalidomide scandal in Europe.3 6 Ironically, thalidomide was not distributed in the United States even before
1962 because it could not meet the safety requirements of the 1938 statute.
The 1962 grandfather clause exempts from the new drug requirements
any drug which on October 10, 1962, the day before the enactment of
the 1962 amendments, was commercially available in the United States,
was generally regarded as safe "among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety of drugs," 37 and was not the
subject of a new drug application pending at that time.
The proponents of laetrile use have argued that (1) laetrile is not a
drug, (2) laetrile is not a "new drug," because it is generally recognized
as safe and effective, and (3) laetrile meets the requirement of the 1962
grandfather clause and is thus exempt from regulation under the Act. The
last of these arguments is the only legal argument seriously considered
by the courts.
In 1975 the proponents of the use of laetrile were frustrated by what
they perceived to be the unavailability of the new drug approval process.
The process is a highly complex and expensive one, essentially unavailable to all but the large drug companies. In 1970 one laboratory had
sought an IND to prove the safety and effectiveness of laetrile. The FDA
originally approved the IND, but, in a very unusual procedure, withdrew
the approval within a week of its issuance because of the Agency's belief
that preliminary testing did not yield any justification for further testing
in human subjects.38 Thus, in 1975, the FDA considered the importation
or interstate movement in commerce of laetrile for treatment or research
to be a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.
Although the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not, as a matter of
federal law, apply to the production and distribution of laetrile within a
state, it applies indirectly. Many states have promulgated statutes which
make it unlawful to produce, distribute, prescribe or use any drug not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.3 9 Some states, like Cal36. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Kefauver, author of the 1962 amendments, when his bill
came to the floor of the Senate: "The tragedy involving thalidomide, horrible though it is, has served
the useful purpose of dramatizing some of the abuses in the drug industry and has underscored the
urgent need for laws to insure that drugs like thalidomide never get to the American public." 108
Cong. Rec. 15,530 (1962).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1976). See also Drug Amendments of 1962-Effective Dates and Transitional Provisions, S. Rep. No. 1744. 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2884, 2931.
38. Michael L. Culbert discusses this strange series of events in Vitamin B 17: Forbidden Weapon
Against Cancer (1974). The book is itself discussed in the first district court Rutherford opinion.
399 F. Supp. at 1213.
39. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §780-110 (Purdon 1977).
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ifomia, outlaw the distribution of any "unproven" cancer cure.4" In any
case, the FDA insists that interstate shipment "of anything from apricot
pits to bottle stoppers" would bring the final product within the agency's
authority."a Whether the FDA could legally extend its jurisdiction in this
way, its threat has been sufficient to dissuade reputable drug companies
and physicians from making the drug available for any purpose.4 2 Thus,
when the FDA withdrew its approval of the IND for laetrile, it effectively
removed the drug from the legal market in the United States.
B. State of the Scientific Research on Laetrile in 1975
Very little formal research on the toxicity or the efficacy of laetrile
appeared before 1976. Laetrile, the popular name for amygdalin, is present in large quantities in apricot pits, rose hips, lima beans, bitter almonds,
cherry pits, and many other fruits and vegetables. The first formal chemical evaluation of laetrile, as amygdalin, appeared in 1965. 43 In 1971,
Dean Burke, then with the National Cancer Institute, published the results
of his studies with A.R.L. MacNaughton (of the MacNaughton Foundation) and the German researcher M. Von Ardenne on the effects of
amygdalin on Ehrlich ascites carcinoma cells." One other author published an article on the chemical composition of amygdalin in 1971 .4
A few studies in animals demonstrated little or no efficacy for amygdalin
alone or in combination with other substances.46 Whether because of the
negative results in animal studies or because of an anti-laetrile bias, there
40. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1707.1 (West 1979) makes it a misdemeanor to sell, deliver,
provide, or prescribe any drug to be used in cancer treatment unless the drug is approved by the
FDA or a California state board. New Jersey has a very similar statute. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 24:6A-1
(West 1975).
41. Spivak, Laetrile's Message to the FDA, Wall Street J., July 21, 1977, at 12.
42. Id.
43. Levi, French, Bickis & Henderson, Laetrile:A Study of Its Physiochemicaland Biochemical
Properties, 92 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 1057 (1965) (finding that "the Canadian and the American
product are different pharmaceutical foundations, displaying different physiochemical and biochemical properties," and citing then current legal materials).
44. They tested cyanide and benzaldehyde as well. Although neither was found to be cancerocidal,
the combination of the two was, as was amygadalin. Burk, MacNaughton & Von Ardenne, Hyperthemy of Cancer Cells with Amygdalin-Glucosidase, and Synergistic Action of Derived Cyanide and

Benzaldehyde. 13 Panminerva Med. 520 (1971). See also Burk, Effects of Amygdalin, Prinasin,
Mardelonitrile,and HCN-Benzaldehyde on the Pasteur Effect, Metabolic Death, and Trypan Blue
Staining of EhrlichAscite CarcinomaCells, Progressin Antimicrobial andAnticancer Chemotherapy

(Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Chemotherapy) (1971).
45. Llenado & Rechnitz, Improved Enzyme Electrode for Amygdalin, 43 Anal. Chem. 1457
(1971).
46. See, e.g., Campbell, Laetrileand Schistosomiasis, 184 Science 588 (1974); Laster & Schabel,
Experimental Studies of the Antitumor Activity of Amygdalin MF (NSC-15780) Alone and in Coin-
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have been few clinical studies of laetrile's efficacy outside of Mexico and
the Philippines.47 Most of the American reports are anecdotal case reports,
although one early American study held out some promise for the use of
laetrile in human subjects. 4
There was a similar lack of research on the toxicity of laetrile. Although
one of the early researchers who found laetrile to be effective also found
it to be toxic when taken orally,49 all of the evidence of the toxicity is
anecdotal. The "evidence" of the toxicity of laetrile included cases of
cyanide poisoning from the ingestion of chokecherry seeds5" and from a
diet of improperly processed cassava." Animal studies on the toxicity of
laetrile conducted before 1976 show a toxic reaction only at extremely
high dosages.52 There was simply no evidence that laetrile was toxic when
taken at the dosages recommended by those prescribing the drug. When
the Rutherford case began in 1975, there was very little reliable data of
any kind that would demonstrate whether laetrile was either effective or
toxic.
C. The Rutherford Complaint
In 1971 Glen Rutherford was diagnosed as having cancer-more precisely, an invasive adenocarcinoma-and informed that surgery, including
bination With Beta-Glucosidase (NSC-128056), 59 Cancer Chemotherapy Rep. 951 (1975); Wodinsky
& Swiniarski, Antitumor Activity ofAmygdalin MF (NSC-15780) as a Single Agent and With BetaGlucosidase (NSC-128056) on a Spectrum of Transplantable Rodent Tumors, 59 Cancer Chemotherapy Rep. 939 (1975); Hill, Shine, Hill & Miller, Failure ofAmygdalin to Arrest B-16 Melanoma
and BW5147 AKR Leukemia, 36 Cancer Research 2102 (1976).
47. The most frequently cited foreign sources are the reports of clinicians. Ernesto Contreras runs
a clinic in Mexico and Manuel Navarro has used laetrile clinically in the Philippines. There has
been at least one Italian trial, and a number of studies have been reported in Germany, most of
which are not clinical. The foreign studies which are often cited include: Navarro, Laetrile Therapy
in Cancer, 4 Phil. J. Cancer 204 (1964); Navarro, Five Years Experience With Laetrile Therapy in
Advanced Cancer, 1957 Phil. J. Cancer 289; Tasca, Clinical Observations on the Therapeutic Effects
of a Cyanogenetic Glucuronoside in Cases of Human Malignant Neoplasms, 118 Gazzetta Medica
Italiana 513 (1959); Navarro, Laetrile in Malignancy, 10 St. Tomas J. Med. 113 (1955); Reitnauer,
Mandelonitrile-Gylocosides in Cancer Research and Cancer Therapy: The Amygdalin Problem, 22
Arzneimittel-Forschung 1347 (1972) (including extensive bibliography); Summa, Amygdalin, A Physiologically Active Therapeutic Agent in Cancer, 4 Krebsgeschehen 110 (1972), abstracted in 24
Experta Med. Cancer 2098 (1973); Von Ardenne & Reitnauer, Tumor Hyperacidulation Through
Intravenous Glucose Infusion Enhanced by Amygdalin and Beta-Glucosidase Application, 45 Archiv
Geschwulstforschung 135 (1975); Nahrstadt, The lsomerization of Amygdalin and Its Homologues,
308 Archiv der Pharmazie 903 (1975).
48. Morrone, Chemotherapy of Inoperable Cancer: Preliminary Report of Ten Cases Treated with
Laetrile, 20 Experimental Medicine & Surgery 299 (1962). Dr. Morrone found that the use of laetrile
"provided dramatic relief of pain, discontinuance of narcotics, control of fever, improved appetite,
and reduction of adenopathy," as well as the possible regression of the malignant lesions. Id. at
308.
49. See Morrone, id.
50. Laetrile: Report Under Fire from Within, 113 Science News 4 (1978).
51. Williams & Osuntokun, Peripheral Neuropathv in Tropical (Nutritional) Ataxia in Nigeria,
21 Archives of Neurology 475 (1969).
52. Wodinsky & Swiniarski, supra note 46; Laster & Schabel, supra note 46.
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the removal of his rectum, would be necessary. He was upset by the
prospects of this treatment, refused the surgery and went to Mexico where
he was treated with laetrile. He returned to the United States after several
weeks of laetrile treatment and continued to take laetrile while at home.
The Mexican clinic continued to deliver laetrile to Mr. Rutherford until
1975, when the courier was arrested and Rutherford's supply of laetrile
was seized. Mr. Rutherford then moved to intervene in an action which
had been commenced by other terminally ill cancer patients who were
seeking authority to import laetrile for their personal use. By the time
the case came up for a hearing in the district court, the two original
plaintiffs had died.
In August, Judge Bohanon of the Federal District Court, Western District of Oklahoma, rendered an opinion which demonstrated his exasperation with the FDA's treatment of laetrile. He was apparently disturbed
by the Agency's cavalier defense to Mr. Rutherford's earnest arguments,
and by the inability of the FDA to produce any evidence of toxicity for
laetrile that could justify its unyielding position and its adamant refusal
to investigate the drug. As the judge pointed out, "inaction by the FDA
constitutes the crux of plaintiff's procedural dilemma . . . " Transparently sharing in Mr. Rutherford's frustration with an overbearing FDA,
the judge concluded that "the plaintiff Rutherford and those similarly
situated are wholly without means or resources to comply with the provisions of [the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act]" and that the evidence
supported the findings that "laetrile is not a toxic or harmful substance
if used in proper dosage, but is on the other hand an alternative treatment
54
of cancer which can be used in lieu of surgery or radiation cobalt."
Judge Bohanon did not hide the source of his real concern. The FDA
simply had no reason-in science or in logic-to deny Mr. Rutherford
his laetrile. The court informed the FDA that if it were to pursue its battle
with proponents of laetrile, it ought to develop a scientific arsenal.
IV. FORCING THE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW: 1976 and 1977
A. Judicial Determinationsin the Rutherford Case
The United States appealed Judge Bohanon's Rutherford decision to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court affirmed, but in an opinion
that was less self-righteous and angry, and more focused, than was the
opinion of the lower court. 5 The court did not conclude that laetrile did
(or did not) have medical value. Instead, it concluded that "the FDA's
53. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
54. Id.at 1213, 1214-15.
55. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
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record is grossly inadequate and consists merely of a conclusory affidavit
of an official of the FDA which in effect declares that [laetrile] is a new
drug because the FDA says it is and thus is subject to all the statutory
vagaries of such a designation." 56 The Tenth Circuit would not accept
the FDA position that only those issues which the Agency itself thought
to be important enough to warrant review could be reviewed in the courts. 7
The court concluded that the FDA was obliged to prepare a formal record
to justify its determination that laetrile was not exempted from the new
drug approval process under the Act's 1962 grandfather clause. Because
the court concluded that the resolution of the underlying problem depended on a scientific inquiry which the FDA was compelled to make,
the court of appeals did not reach the constitutional issues suggested in
the first district court opinion. 8
The next step in the Rutherford odyssey should have been the FDA's
development of the laetrile record required by the court of appeals. Instead, however, the case found its way back into Judge Bohanon's court
in March of 1977 on the plaintiff's "Application to Clarify Plaintiff
Class." 59 Rutherford claimed to bring the action on behalf of a class
composed of all terminally ill patients. Because of the class action organization of the lawsuit, it could continue even if Rutherford, the "named
plaintiff," were to die. 6" The United States had opposed the prosecution
of the litigation in class action form because, it argued, "the class plaintiffs
purport to represen[t] is 'too ill-defined and ephemeral in makeup' to
render its members 'capable of definite identification.' "6 Judge Bohanon
formally certified the class, and allowed the action to be prosecuted as a
class action because: "In cases such as this, where the ultimate effectiveness of a federal remedy may depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action device, all judicial discretion should be directed
toward allowing the class action. "62
In the same opinion the court undertook a determination of whether
laetrile was a "new drug." The FDA apparently raised this issue once
again in its attempt to persuade the court not to continue its injunction
against enforcing the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act against laetrile im56. Id.at 1140.
57. Id. at1143.
58. Id.at 1144.
59. Rutherford v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 506, 508 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
60. The fact that a lawsuit becomes moot in respect to a named class member does not make it
moot as to other unnamed class members. If the adversary relationship remains, the courts can
resolve the action. Franks v. Bowman Transp., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In any case, the Rutherford
case had become a classic example of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" aspect of the
law of moomess. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
61. 429 F. Supp. at 508.
62. Id. at 509.
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porters, pending the FDA's development of the administrative record.
This time the court made it very clear that the injunction did not rest
upon any judicial finding as to the scientific merit of the laetrile; the
decision rested entirely on the failure of the defendant to do a proper and
scientific evaluation. As the court pointed out:
Defendants have introduced evidence tending to establish the general
opposition of medical authority in this country to the use of laetrile.
Contrarily, the Court is aware of instances of patients and physicians
in various parts of the country emphasizing personal experiences
with laetrile's ability to counteract aspects of the disease's manifestations and discomforts. Regardless, such issue is not before the
Court, and the Court is cognizant that it possesses "neither the fato independently determine the drug's thercilities nor the 6expertise"
3
apeutic value.

The court explained:
[Tihe issue of the efficacy of laetrile is, at most, of secondary importance in this case. The legality of FDA's ban on laetrile is under
attack on the theory that FDA arbitrarily and without sufficient basis
in fact characterized laetrile as a "new drug;" so far FDA has presented little, if any, evidence to combat that allegation. 6'

In July, 1977, the FDA released the formal report it had been preparing
in response to the earlier Tenth Circuit opinion. 65 Despite the conflicting
evidence the FDA had received on the efficacy and toxicity of laetrile,
and despite the inconsistent evidence the Agency had received on laetrile's
status under the 1962 grandfather clause, the report ws unequivocally
opposed to the use of laetrile. The FDA had no trouble reaching exactly
the conclusions it had reached regularly since 1970, and exactly the
conclusions it had predicted it would reach in the new inquiry. The report
read more like a brief in support of the FDA position than a real inquiry
into the substantive issues.
63. Id.at 510.
64. Id.at 511. Judge Bohanon was not the only judge to be concerned by arbitrary and scientifically
unjustifiable decisions to ban laetrile. About the same time the California Court of Appeals overturned
the conviction of Dr. James Privitera for conspiring to prescribe laetrile in violation of a statute
making it a crime to prescribe an unproven cancer treatment. There the court pointed out that
"[clonceming the efficacy of amygdalin, this court, this opinion, does not enter that fray. The
effectiveness of amygdalin as a cure for cancer or as a nutritional aid with general health-giving
benefits is not, as a matter of law [at issue here]." 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, _,141 Cal. Rptr. 764,
769, vacated, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979). The California court was
straightforward in warning that "to require the doctor to use only orthodox 'state sanctioned' methods
of treatment under threat of criminal penalty for variance is to invite a repetition in California of
141 Cal.
the Soviet experience with 'Lysenkoism.' " People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d at _,
Rptr. at 774.
65. Laetrile, 42 Fed. Reg. 39767 (1977).
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At about the same time the FDA issued the report, it intensified its
public relations campaign against the use of laetrile. The NovemberDecember 1977 FDA Drug Bulletin included an article on the toxicity of
laetrile. The FDA reprinted the article and distributed it along with an
oversized poster containing a "laetrile warning." 66 An article entitled
Laetrile, the Making of a Myth appeared in the December 1976-January
1977 FDA Consumer. This article was also reprinted in slick glossy form,
complete with a photograph of a "laetrile victim," apparently being abused
by a greedy and fraudulent snake oil salesman lurking in the shadows.
Thus far, the judicial attempt to stimulate laetrile research had only resulted in a superficial, biased FDA report and publicity for the drug. The
controversy remained unresolved.
B. Scientific Research and Medical Publications
Although little scientific research on laetrile was published during 1976
and 1977, many of the major medical journals began to carry editorials
condemning laetrile use. Because it seemed that laetrile might qualify
under the 1962 grandfather exemption from the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, and because toxicity of laetrile would have to be demonstrated in
order to keep it off the market if it did qualify under the clause, articles
with anecdotal evidence of laetrile toxicity began metastasizing throughout the medical literature. The lack of scientific evidence, however, was
becoming conspicuous. Those who opposed the use of laetrile were beginning to realize that scientific evidence would be necessary to support
their position. Suddenly, a drug which had created very little interest,
and which had been presumed to be non-toxic, was the subject of an
extraordinary amount of toxicity research. 67 The transparent legal purpose
of this hastened research cast doubt on its scientific value.
Almost immediately upon the FDA Commissioner's release of his
report and the administrative record he had compiled to support it, Mr.
Rutherford was back before Judge Bohanon to challenge its conclusion.
Judge Bohanon agreed with Rutherford as to the failures of the report.
The court issued an injunction directing those responsible for enforcement
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act not to act against laetrile or its users.
66. Toxicity of Laetrile, FDA Drug Bulletin, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 26-32. The inset contained this
message for physicians:
"PLEASE POST. The centerfold of this Drug Bulletin contains a poster being
issued by the Food and Drug Administration to warn about the dangers of laetrile.
The Centerfold can be easily removed from this Bulletin. We encourage health
professionals to post it where it can be seen by cancer victims, their families,
and the general public."
Id.
67. See, e.g., all the anecdotal evidence from this period collected in Herbert, Laetrile: The Cult
of Cyanide, Promoting Poisonfor Profit, 32 Am. J. Clinical Nutrition (1979).
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Judge Bohanon was clearly unwilling to allow the laetrile controversy,
involving serious questions of science and policy, to be resolved on the
basis of an inadequate and biased scientific review. The court's analysis
was similar to that of the plurality of the United States Supreme Court
in the Industrial Union case, 68 where the court considered the validity of
the scientific research involved to be significant to the determination of
when a court could overturn an administrative determination. In concluding that the district court should intervene only when "the agency
really has not taken a single 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has
not genuinely engaged in a reasoned decision-making," 6 9 Judge Bohanon
did not attempt to evaluate what scientific results the agency should have
reached. Rather, the court merely evaluated the objectivity of the agency's
scientific process:
Considerable evidence calls into question FDA's sense of objectivity in this case.
When this suit was initiated, FDA had declared Laetrile a "new
drug" without ever having constructed an administrative record in
support of such designation. .

.

. Ideally, agency decisions and con-

clusions should flow from a probing and objective analysis of a
carefully amassed and encompassing factual record. When ordered
on remand to conduct an appropriate investigation, FDA begrudgingly announced its intention to do so and then previous to ever
having received the evidence on which its conclusions are ostensibly
based, FDA reaffirmed its same, entrenched positions on the salient
issues in the case. .

.

. Understandably many contributors to the

administrative record expressed skepticism concerning the proceedings' fairness. 70
The federal district court's continuing frustration with the FDA's failure
even to permit any neutral scientific review of the evidence appeared as
the basis for this third Bohanon opinion. At one point the judge suggested
that: "The current debate is fierce. The issue appears largely unresolved
as to Laetrile's true effectiveness, in large part because FDA has prevented
adequate testing on humans." 7 ' Finally, the court concluded that: "It is
only when a substance is openly used, and its results carefully observed
and fully reported that this controversy will be resolved." 72 The court
found laetrile exempted from the operation of the "new drug" regulations
under the 1962 grandfather clause because it was apparent that: "It is
only within the context of FDA's creation of this record that the spectre
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
Id. at 1290-91 n.5 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1294.
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of Laetrile's toxicity has even been raised."" The opinion also included
a gratuitous argument that the application of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to Mr. Rutherford to deny him access to laetrile would constitute
a violation of his constitutional right to privacy. That argument was
unnecessary to the court's decision, and it has not been the subject of
any serious judicial review.74
At the end of 1977 it was clear that the FDA simply was not permitting
any scientific closure of the laetrile controversy. The district court did all
within its legal authority to deflect the issue out of the courtroom and
into a setting in which scientists would be able to develop and evaluate
reliable data. If the medical community wanted a resolution of the laetrile
debate, it would have one-but only if it would provide an honest and
rigorous technical evaluation of the scientific questions.
V. THE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY BEGINS: 1978

By January of 1978 the scientific community began to take seriously
the responsibility imposed by the court in the Rutherford case. The January 26, 1978 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine75 maintained
a debate on laetrile. That debate was very different from earlier articles,
which had been concerned with how to best combat quackery involved
with laetrile. In his introduction to the issue, Laetrilomania-Again,Arnold Relman admitted that:
surely most concerned citizens who are now wondering whether the
medical establishment may be stubbornly overlooking a valuable
adjunct to cancer therapy ought to be satisfied if laetrile were tested
in a rigorous clinical trial and found worthless. I suspect that there
are physicians as well as patients who would like to have any remaining doubt settled in this manner.76
The "Sounding Board" debate which followed Dr. Relman's introduction
was a debate on the adequacy of formal clinical testing techniques rather
than the adequacy of public relations techniques. This step was tentative,
however. Guy Newell, Deputy Director of NCI, explained that "after
much discussion, the National Cancer Institute decided that before a
decision is made about requesting permission for clinical trial, we should
attempt to document by a retrospective review of case records whether
73. Id. at 1298 n.24.
74. Eventually, after the case was remanded from the United States Supreme Court. the Tenth
Circuit formally rejected this argument, but with essentially no discussion or analysis. 616 F.2d 455,
457 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
75. 298 New Eng. J. Med. 215, 220 (1978).
76. Relman, Laetrilomania-Again, 298 New Eng. 1. Med. 215 (1978).
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or not bona fide responses to laetrile have occurred."" This kind of case
study research would be unlikely to satisfy the curious members of the
scientific community, who mistrust anecdotal evidence.
In contrast, Charles Moertel, who was soon to be engaged in a Phase
II study of laetrile, announced that clinical studies of laetrile ought to be
commenced immediately. He admitted that "the simple fact is that laetrile
has never been properly studied in the hands of those competent to make
such a judgment," and that "perhaps an even more compelling reason
for a clinical trial is the lingering doubt, which must be harbored by any
scientific mind, that perhaps the overwhelming public acceptance of this
therapy could reflect some element of therapeutic effectiveness." 78 Both
Dr. Relman and Dr. Moertel pointed to the Rutherford case as a significant
factor encouraging the development of a formal clinical trial of laetrile.
The court had succeeded in provoking at least the suggestion of responsible scientific inquiry.
By the end of 1978 the medical community was engaged in a formal
scientific evaluation of the toxicity and effectiveness of laetrile. On September 7, 1978, NCI completed its retrospective review of laetrile treatments, and the results-which were far more favorable to those supporting
the use of laetrile than its sponsors would have predicted-were published
in a special report in the New England Journal of Medicine. 79 By the
beginning of 1979 the NCI had applied to the FDA for an IND to begin
formal clinical testing of laetrile. The Food and Drug Administration
reacted to this request more positively than it had reacted to the MacNaughton request eight years before, and a Phase I (pharmacologic and
toxicological) study of laetrile commenced shortly thereafter.
VI. JUDICIAL WITHDRAWAL IN FAVOR OF SCIENTIFIC

STUDY (1979-1981)

By coincidence, the FDA's appeal of the Rutherford case to the Tenth
Circuit was argued on the same day that the New England Journal of
Medicine published the Relman-Newell-Moertel discussion."0 By the time
the court of appeals had rendered its determination in July, the major
substantive issue had been successfully deflected back into the laboratories. The Tenth Circuit's unanimous opinion affirmed the district court,
but on very narrow grounds. 8' The court of appeals refused to consider
77. Newell, Why the National Cancer Institute Chooses a Case-RecordReview of Laetrile, 298
New Eng. J. Med. 218 (1978).
78. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 New Eng. J. Med.218 (1978).
79. See Ellison, supra note 4.
80. This date was January 26, 1978.
81. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
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either the adequacy of the administrative record or the claim that an
underlying constitutional right of privacy encompassed a patient's right
to use an unproven drug. Instead, the court concluded that the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act's "safety" and "effectiveness" requirements were
senseless in the case of a terminally ill patient for whom, by definition,
nothing that has been medically proven is effective.82 The opinion was
circumspect; the principle on which it was based would be applicable in
only a few cases. It was a significant opinion primarily because it left
the scientific burden on the medical community.
By the time the United States Supreme Court made its only review of
the Rutherford case, 83 the issue was well on its way to being resolved in
the laboratory. Apparently unwilling to become deeply involved in a
mixed issue of science and policy that already was being formally resolved
by scientists, the United States Supreme Court restricted its evaluation
of the case to the narrow issue that constituted the basis of the court of
appeal's determination. The Supreme Court chose not even to mention
the underlying constitutional and administrative issues in its decision.
Instead, the unanimous Court found that the Tenth Circuit had erred in
concluding that the "safety" and "effectiveness" provisions of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act did not apply to the terminally ill, and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration. On remand, the court
of appeals wrote a very short opinion rejecting the legal argument proffered by Rutherford without offering any analysis. 84 The United States
Supreme Court refused to review this last Tenth Circuit determination of
the Rutherford case, and thus that opinion became the final opinion in
the case. There remains, however, no binding United States Supreme
Court precedent on the underlying constitutional and administrative issues. The Supreme Court simply avoided those issues when it had to
hear the case, and it avoided hearing the case when it otherwise would
have had to decide those issues.
Five years and seven formal opinions after the institution of the Rutherford case, that lawsuit was resolved without the development of any
substantial body of nationally binding precedent. On the other hand, the
judiciary successfully deflected a serious controversy with both scientific
and policy components into the medical laboratories which had refused
to entertain the controversy before the lawsuit had begun. Early in 1981
the Mayo Clinic reported that its Phase I study of laetrile demonstrated
that "the administration of amygdalin according to the dosages and sched82. Id.
83. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
84. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937
(1980).
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ules that we employed seems to be free of significant side effects." 85 Four
nationally respected cancer centers, with a NCI grant and an IND issued
by the Food and Drug Administration, then commenced Phase II (initial
efficacy) clinical studies in the "hope that the ongoing studies will provide
definitive information regarding possible anti-neoplastic activity, symptomatic benefit, or both associated with amygdalin therapy." 8 6 Ultimately
that study persuasively demonstrated that laetrile, although not toxic, was
not effective in treating the wide range of tested cancers. The judiciary
thus successfully transformed the laetrile controversy from a legal controversey to be determined in the courts back into a medical controversy
which ought to be-and will be-determined in the laboratory.
VII. CONCLUSION
The study of judicial intervention into the laetrile controversy does not
reveal a legal system anxious to wrest a scientific issue from the hands
of laboratory physicians and resolve it in some alternative non-technical
way. Nor does this study show a legal system which necessarily withdraws
from participation in a public policy controversy whenever technical experts define the controversy as a scientific one. Rather, the legal battle
over access to laetrile demonstrates that the courts may participate in the
resolution of a dispute which includes scientific and public policy elements. Furthermore, the laetrile controversy shows that the judiciary may
regard the process by which the scientists resolve the scientific part of
such a controversy to be itself an issue of public policy.
The laetrile controversy presents an interesting example of attempts at
a variety of kinds of closure because the controversy includes such precisely distinguished public policy and scientific questions. The antagonists
dispute laetrile's medical value-its safety and efficacy in treating any
form of cancer. That is essentially a scientific controversy, although the
method by which it is resolved by scientists may have public policy
implications. The antagonists also dispute, at least implicitly, whether
any finding as to safety and efficacy ought to be relevant to the determination of whether the substance ought to be available for the treatment
of terminally ill cancer patients. That is essentially a public policy controversy.
Although the "laetrile question" includes serious scientific and policy
controversies, the strongest proponents of each side originally cast their
arguments only in scientific terms. The traditional scientific communitythose who generally have access to the more respected journals and to
85. Moertel, supra note 5, at 594.
86. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

government agencies-refused to consider seriously the unorthodox arguments advanced in favor of laetrile therapy. As a result, much of the
scientific community at first refused to recognize the laetrile dispute as
a legitimate scientific controversy at all. Those who believed that the
supporters of laetrile were unscientific medical charlatans incompetent to
understand the underlying issues, refused to admit their adversaries to
the scientific debate. Because they perceived the issue to be entirely one
of science, they refused to recognize the very existence of controversy.
To most of the medical establishment in 1975, the proponents of laetrile
were patently wrong, and the controversy-to the extent one might have
existed-had already been the subject of what Tom Beauchamp describes
as "sound argument closure," i.e., consensus acceptance 8of7 clearly unassailable reasoning which requires a particular resolution.
This presumed closure was necessarily ephemeral because those engaged in purely medical debate were not the only stakeholders. Those
who chose to disbelieve or ignore the conclusions accepted by the traditional medical community were themselves ignored by that community.
The issues, however, were ultimately much broader than the traditional
scientific one, and the class of bona fide participants in the controversy,
and thus the real stakeholders in its ultimate resolution, included those
who did not participate in the traditional medical dialogue. Therefore,
the "sound argument closure" which would satisfy the medical community could not end the debate.
The agency which has been given primary authority to resolve controversies like the one that has developed around laetrile is the FDA. Congress established the FDA to provide adequate scientific resolutions to
what Congress found to be essentially scientific questions. 8 It was established to evaluate medical data generated by trials of proposed new
drugs.
The Agency's fairness and neutrality in performing these evaluations
were to be guaranteed by an established and respected formal procedure. 8 9
In reaching its goal, the FDA is statutorily required to evaluate scientific
data to determine if a new drug is "generally recognized as safe and
87. Beauchamp, supra note 1.Although Dr. Beauchamp applies his classification scheme only
to policy and value issues in his paper, his scheme applies equally well to scientific issues. In fact,
his description of "sound argument closure" describes a phenomenon much more common in scientific
debate than in value controversy. The author uses Dr. Beauchamp's term here to refer to the part
of the laetrile controversy that includes only scientific questions.
88. As Senator Humphrey declaimed in supporting the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act, "[E]xcellence in administration requires excellence in the scientific decision upon
which administration is based." 108 Cong. Rec. 16,355 (1962). Senator Humphrey went on to
discuss the importance of upgrading science within the FDA.
89. The statute itself provides the administrative procedure for approval of new drugs. 21 U.S.C.
§355 (1976).
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effective. "' The charge to the FDA is not to determine if the drug is safe
and effective, but rather to determine if it is generally recognized as
such-that is, if there is a consensus among traditional scientists that it
is safe and effective. In essence, the charge to the FDA is to determine
whether there has been "sound argument closure" of the scientific issue.
Although the FDA views its drug approval process as an entirely technical
endeavor, the federal agency is obliged by the public policy behind its
creation as well as the due process clause of the fifth amendment to
provide a fair and evenhanded process for making these technical determinations. In this sense, the charge to the FDA is to provide a forum for
what Dr. Beauchamp calls "procedural closure" of the underlying issues-that is, to provide a process which will certainly and necessarily
impose a resolution on the controversy at least for some carefully defined
purposes. To satisfy its legislative mandate, the FDA has established a
procedure for determining whether there has been sound argument closure
of essentially scientific disputes. This strange hybrid of procedural closure
and sound argument closure, a bastard of science and law, was ineffective
in finally imposing closure on the scientific debate surrounding laetrile
because, like the traditional scientists engaged in the debate, it failed to
recognize all of the issues at stake.
Mr. Rutherford's lawsuit against the FDA did not impose judicial "procedural closure" on the scientific debate. The judiciary would not have
been able to render a decision that would terminate the sustained discussion that had come to characterize the controversy. The scientific
aspects of the debate will have to be the subject of an internal scientific
resolution; no externally imposed solution will satisfy the antagonists.
Throughout the Rutherford litigation, the courts recognized the futility
of imposing an answer without scientific evidence. Of course, the courts
could have resolved the controversy by formally addressing the pure
policy issue and declaring that the constitutional right of privacy encompasses the use of laetrile, whatever its scientific merit. Such a decision
would have left the underlying medical issue unresolved, and all of the
participants in the controversy unsatisfied. The scientific issue is sufficiently important to warrant the courts' decisions to avoid the constitutional issues as long as a scientific resolution remains a real possibility.
The courts have taken the legal and scientific issues seriously and
evaluated them rigorously. The courts have thus encouraged scientists
with appropriate expertise to seek to resolve the scientific question underlying the laetrile controversy. As soon as it became clear that the FDA
and the NCI were undertaking the studies that would be likely to lead to
90. 21 U.S.C. § 321(4)(4) (1976) (emphasis added). For a summary of the statutory scheme
applied by the FDA in evaluating new drugs, see supra section ll(a).
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the sound argument closure of the general issues in the laetrile debate,
the judiciary simply withdrew. The courts have never addressed the scientific aspects of the controversy-the safety and effectiveness of laetrile.
They have merely addressed the policy dispute over whether there ought
to be a scientific investigation of the drug. By affording both the proponents and opponents of laetrile a hearing, the courts' actions have
resulted in something akin to "negotiation closure," as Beauchamp describes it, of that preliminary question. 9 ' The needs of the parties for
valid scientific investigation were aired and addressed in court. The scientific evaluation of the drug was finally conducted, albeit in a fashion
not ideal from either perspective, to the satisfaction of laetrile boosters.
Formal and rigorous clinical testing was finally initiated, but, to the
satisfaction of the medical establishment, the research was finally being
done in a forum and by researchers respected by laetrile's detractors.
While some view the eventual outcome of the Rutherford case as a
setback for the proponents of laetrile,9 2 those who seek a lasting and
scientific resolution of the problem see the judicial deflection of the issue
into the laboratories as a major step forward. The consequence of legal
intervention was to require scientists who were unwilling or politically
unable to permit a scientific inquiry to do the research necessary to bring
forward the sound arguments necessary as the foundation for meaningful
closure. Of course, other social policy issues remain-but they may be
rendered moot by an accepted resolution of the primary issues. There
would have been little medical opposition to a proven cancer treatment,
and there is now little public demand for one proven ineffective. With
the scientific issue disposed of, there is simply no scientific or political
interest in discussing the unresolved policy issues-at least by those who
remain stakeholders only in the laetrile controversy.
The resolution of the laetrile controversy has been shaped and directed
in three fora, with three methods of dispute resolution. Congress encouraged "negotiation closure" of some of the policy issues through the
enactment of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the creation of the
FDA. The courts imposed procedural requirements on the laboratory
process, consonant with the "procedural closure" with which courts solve
conflict. Just as the legislature is the paradigm of a forum established to
resolve controversies through "negotiation closure" and the judiciary is
the paradigm of a forum established to resolve conflicts through "procedural closure," the laboratory-and its accompanying academic activ91. Beauchamp, supra note 1.
92. See, e.g., Brant & Graceffa, Rutherford, Privitera,and Chad Green: Laetrile's Setbacks in
the Courts, 6 Am. J. Law & Med. 156 (1980).
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ity-is the paradigm of a forum which acts to resolve controversies through
"sound argument closure." The medical laboratories in the case of the
laetrile dispute eventually did produce the information necessary for "sound
argument closure." An evaluation of the laetrile litigation reveals that the
legislature, the courts, and the scientific community may participate in
the resolution of complex controversies of science and public policy in
more than one way, and that each may act as an appropriate check upon
the others.

